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TWO LETTERS ON THE WAR

Privately Printed for
Members of the Princeton Faculty

I. On the proposal to petition the President to put this nation in a position of definite moral approbation of the Entente Allies and in as definite moral disapprobation of the Central Teutonic Empires.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

January 17th, 1916.

Professor Frank A. Fetter,
Dear Professor Fetter:

I am hereby returning to you unsigned the proposed petition to the President submitted by your committee to members of the Princeton faculty. While I cannot admit the right of any individual, be he private citizen or president, to put any other individual or group of individuals "in a position of definite moral approbation or definite moral disapprobation" of any cause or country, I conceive it to be not only my right but my duty to express to your committee the reasons why your proposal meets with my very definite disapproval.

I disapprove both on hypothetical and actual grounds.

I. Even if I agreed with your premises I should most emphatically disagree with so lame and impotent a conclusion as you come to. Your "whereas's" rumble ominously and portend action, your "therefore" is mild and meaningless. You even diplomatically shrink from the word "condemnation" which is the minimum of moral reaction your preambles demand. Parturiunt montes, et nascitur ridiculus mus. If I believed, as you seem to, that the future of our political ideals and our national safety are bound up with the cause of the Entente Allies and that their defeat would mean eventual moral and material disaster to our country, I should be ashamed,

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
for myself, to sign a petition asking the President for nothing more than to commit the nation to "definite moral disapprobation of the central Teutonic empires." If your premises are correct, you ought to have asked for much more than moral approbation or disapprobation. Your proposal to attack by official moral ostracism a group of nations whom others are giving their lives and treasure to disable, would only earn the contempt of both belligerents, and unite Allies and Teutonic Powers in saying to us and our government:

Art thou afar'd
To be the same in thine own act and valor
As thou art in desire? Wouldst thou have that
Which thou esteemst the ornament of life,
And live a coward in thine own esteem,
Letting I dare not wait upon I would
Like the poor cat in the adage.

It is easy to have more respect for your moderation than for that of Colonel Roosevelt, it is difficult not to have more respect for his consistency.

Definite moral disapprobation is a poor weapon to fight the devil with, and if he speak German, as according to your demonology he does exclusively, it is unlikely that he would understand the phrase. The devil ought to be damned not disapproved. Even among individuals, definite moral disapprobation to be effective must be practised from a considerable elevation. I would not constitute myself a judge of the moral elevation necessary to qualify an individual for such sweeping and general if ungenerous disapprobation as you propose. I am quite willing to admit that your committee for whose members individually I have the highest regard, is peculiarly qualified in many respects for international moral censorship; and even though the "ceterum censeo Germaniam delendam esse" of this type of censorship may become somewhat monotonous, no one can deny the right of any sincere man to be monotonous. Monotony is even a necessary concomitant of intense and sincere conviction, as distinguished from that disinterested and free play of thought which is so admirable a characteristic of the French genius. But you are asking the President to make moral beliefs and convictions which probably a large majority of your fellow-citizens do not share with you,—for moral disapprobation of certain acts of the Teutonic powers is far from being equivalent to definite and unqualified ap-

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probation of the Entente Allies,—the basis of an international policy by imposing these moral judgments on the whole nation. In the matter of moral censorship nations cannot rise above the level of the individuals that compose them. If you had asked for a disapprobation of specific deeds you would undoubtedly have secured more signatures but they would have been even more ineffectual in any practical and political sense.

I have no doubt individual members of your committee would have preferred to bring in a resolution asking for action conformable to the situation as stated in your preambles. In that case my dissent from your proposal would have been even stronger on objective national grounds, but much less strong on subjective moral grounds, for I have had to recognize the force of your request, *showed* granting the correctness of your premises. As it is I see little truth in your premises and no force in your conclusion. The thing you ask the President of the United States to do seems to me both a supercilious and a pusillanimous thing, and to involve a more fundamental invasion of individual liberty than anything hitherto threatened by Cossacks, Turcos, Sikhs, Senegalese or other defenders of our political ideals. It is important in the present crisis to delimit the respective spheres of the individual's liberty of judgment and national obligation. If the President of the United States calls upon me to help defend the country against an alien foe, I shall obey; and my private judgment as to the rightness or wrongness of the issue, when a national decision has been reached by constitutional means, neither validates nor invalidates the obligation of service to my country. As long as we recognize nationalism as a necessary organization of humanity for collective action this must be the foundation of our faith. Complete individualism and effective nationalism are at present mutually exclusive, but should the President of the United States call upon me to put myself "in a position of definite moral approbation of the Allies and of as definite moral disapprobation, not of certain deeds, but of the whole cause I should not obey, because I should have given up something without which "the whole fabric of modern civilization as expressed in free governments" would be a meaningless phrase. You believe that German collectivism threatens American ideals of individual liberty. And you propose to protect American liberty against German violation, by asking the President to strangle it himself. Majorities control action but not thought. Minorities may be right

or wrong, but whether right or wrong they have rights even in a democracy. Writing letters is one of them. Moral ostracism of any individual or group of individuals on the basis of a difference of opinion as to the merits of the belligerents is not one of the rights of the majority. I may give my life but not my liberty of moral judgment for my country.

Your proposal to have the President "put this nation in a position of definite moral approbation of the Entente Allies and in a definite moral disapprobation of the Central Teutonic Empires" involves processes of political reasoning and a conception of the constitutional authority of the executive that I find it difficult to follow or understand. During the crisis of the Civil War, where the moral issue was much clearer, Lincoln put the matter as follows:

"If slavery is not wrong nothing is wrong. I cannot remember the time when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act on that judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath, nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power and break the oath in using that power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me practically to indulge my private abstract judgment on the moral question (i.e. slavery). I did understand, however, also that my oath imposed upon me the duty of preserving to the best of my ability by every indispensable means, that government, that nation, of which the constitution was the organic law."

Your proposal seems to me not only unconstitutional but theoretically impossible and practically absurd. I can understand the possibility of a definite private moral approbation or disapprobation of the Central Teutonic Empires, because they are sufficiently organized and conscious of purpose to make moral approbation or disapprobation at any rate rational without regard to the question of its justice. But how there can be any definite moral approbation of anything so indefinite, incoherent, vacillating, chaotically conglomerate and radiantly heterogeneous as the Entente Allies, it would be difficult to imagine. With regard to England's great literary and political tradition it is impossible for me to be objective or "neutral." for they are part of my being. Toward British foreign policies, espe-

cially the politics of her Russian Alliance, I have the same feeling that many Americans who admire German literature and culture, have for German "Weltpolitik." The declared purpose of the Entente Allies, we are told, is the destruction of Prussian militarism for the benefit of humanity and themselves. The declared purpose of the Teutonic Powers, we are also told, involves the destruction of British navalism for equally laudable ends. With both of these purposes America can afford heartily and equally to sympathize. If each had been successful to the extent of the above declared purpose, America might well send sea-congratulations to Germany and land-congratulations to the Allies, but they have both signally failed to damage each other where neutrals could best afford to have the damage done. Yet the real menace to the United States and to modern civilization, is neither the British navy, as the pro-German party in America would have us believe, nor the German army, as the pro-British party claim, but the present international organization or rather disorganization of Europe based on the folly of international laissez-faire backed by competitive armaments, a folly that made necessary and in so far forth justifies the existence of both British navalism and German militarism. This is a much more difficult menace to reach and attack than either of the belligerents but the attempt is worth making for this is a menace that deserves and would get the united moral disapprobation of the civilized world which in my sense includes the Teutonic Empires. The statesman who could commit America to that policy would earn the moral approbation of the neutral nations immediately and of the belligerents eventually, for himself and his country.

The main argument for your proposed policy of moral approbation and disapprobation is that it is both cheap and safe. It costs nothing and risks nothing. If the whole fabric of modern civilization as expressed in free governments is to-day menaced by German aggression I suggest that some such resolution as the following is now justified:

We do respectfully petition the President of the United States to call upon Congress to make such appropriations as he may deem expedient for the purchase of war-supplies for the Entente Allies, said appropriation to be met by special taxation on all incomes.

This would be a practical and quick method of discovering whether a majority of the people of the United States are prepared for a

policy of moral approbation of the Entente Allies and whether they are ready to back up their moral approbation with their cash if not their lives. Moral disapprobation, for which you risk nothing and sacrifice nothing, is not only cheap and safe, it is immoral in any sense of the word that has meaning to me. If the Allies are really fighting for our liberties and our national safety, is it not ignominious for us to charge them exorbitant prices for the munitions they are wasting so valiantly in our defense, a defense, moreover, that puts us under very special obligation because it has been undertaken without any request on our part? The only ones who could object to such a proposal are those who disagree with your premises and those who, while they agree, are making greater profits out of the needs of the allied governments than they could make by manufacturing directly for the United States Government at fair and reasonable prices. If I agreed with your premises I should certainly be willing to subscribe to some such proposal, and I am surprised that you did not make it. Perhaps you intended to do so later, but if you believe in democracy you ought to tell the people what you really intend and not blindfold them into a moral disapprobation that is worse than meaningless unless they understand what it involves.

2. I have tried to show that on the assumption that your premises are correct your proposal falls far short of what is required in the present crisis. On the assumption that they are incorrect it is not necessary to prove, for it is self-evident that your proposal goes too far; for it practically asks the President of the United States formally to abandon his declared policy of neutrality for a policy of unneutrality that is cheap, safe and selfish and therefore worthy of definite moral disapprobation.

I shall in conclusion briefly touch on the four preambles which you make the basis for your proposal. The first states your belief, in the form of a sweeping generalization, "that the whole fabric of modern civilization as expressed in free government and diversity of nationality is to-day menaced by German aggression." Leaving out of consideration the vagueness of the phrase, "diversity of nationality," I believe that any conception of the whole fabric of modern civilization as expressed in free governments that omits Germany, is unfair both to German contributions to modern civilization and untrue to the actual facts of governmental organization in the German Empire. You have stated your belief, permit me to state mine. I believe that the whole fabric of modern civilization is to-day

menaced by the collision between British imperialism dedicated to the maintenance of the status quo by the combined influence of capitalism and sea power on the one hand, and German imperialism dedicated to the challenge of the international status quo and the balance of power by a military nationalism representing the united, intellectual, moral and material resources of the Teutonic Empire. I believe this challenge and Great Britain's answer to it to have been inevitable under the present system of European political industrial and commercial organization. Definite moral disapprobation will have no effect on the outcome. Whether a conference of neutral powers called by the President of the United States would effect anything at the present juncture it is difficult to say. Probably the President knows better than we, but I should be glad to subscribe to a petition asking him to call such a conference, and I feel sure that such a suggestion would be more pertinent to the present international situation and no more impertinent to him than yours. Such a conference could gain the confidence of the belligerents only if it divested itself resolutely of the function of moral censorship and applied itself to the task of preparing a ground for the reorganization of Europe by formulating general terms of settlement which both belligerents would agree to consider. In the event of the impracticability of such action at the present moment, I heartily approve the policy of aggressive defense of neutral rights foreshadowed in a statement by the Secretary of State in this morning's *New York Times*.

With the second preamble I concur as far as it goes, but the inclusion of similar violations of international law by the Entente Allies, an inclusion which candor and fairness would seem to have demanded, would hopelessly confuse your scheme of definite moral approbation and disapprobation. While economic strangulation is less violent, it is no more humane than the practices you describe. Some of the grossest inhumanities in the world to-day are practised without any show of violence, and the worst of such invisible inhumanity is that its purpose is to provoke violence, and to arouse the moral indignation of those good people who are shocked by inhumanity only when it is visible, violent and Teutonic.

The third preamble recites your conviction that "our political ideals and our national safety are bound up with the cause of the Entente Allies, and that their defeat would mean eventual moral and material disaster to our country." This would obviously be true if we

joined the Allies. Otherwise obviously not. Your preamble suggests, what your conclusion shrinks from openly stating,—that we should make sure of the defeat of the Teutonic Empires, if Serbia, Russia, France, England, Japan and Italy cannot do it alone, on the ground that the Teutonic Empires might attack us if victorious.

Then lest they may, prevent; and since the quarrel
Will bear no color for the thing they are
Fashion it thus: that what they are, augmented
Would run to these and these extremities, etc.

It would seem that "justice first" is a better guide in the formulation of international policy than "safety first," and its adoption might also prevent the circulation of petitions analogous to yours in the German Universities. The defeat of the Allies would undoubtedly now involve some financial loss to large interests in this country and this might be interpreted in some quarters as moral disaster or worse.

Your fourth preamble holds the Teutonic governments responsible for a series of acts some of which they have disavowed and offered reparation for, thanks to a firm course of diplomatic procedure by the President, and others of which they have disclaimed knowledge of and responsibility for. Insofar as the acts recited by you have been proved, the President has already dealt with them in an effectual manner, and needs not now to be requested to put this nation into an attitude of definite moral disapprobation with reference to them. Many of these acts were breaches of neutrality rather than of morality, and insofar as they merit moral disapprobation, the President has expressed it in very emphatic language. Much of our trouble has been due to the inability of German subjects liable to military service to leave this country, owing to British control of the seas. Great Britain has compelled us to harbour her enemies and when, by use of the same sea power, a technical neutrality was converted into a de facto support of the Allies without any breach of neutrality on the part of the American government, some of these marooned aliens became guilty of the crime of being patriotic in the wrong country. None should be quicker or more emphatic in condemnation of their lawless deeds and their invasion of the rights of American sovereignty than Americans of German derivation or sympathy who

have through these deeds been subjected to unjust suspicion and ungenerous denunciation.

Though disapproving,—I should prefer to say condemning, many acts of the Teutonic Powers, I consider their successful resistance to the powers united against them essential not only to the preservation of the whole fabric of modern civilization but also to the future growth and free development of the United States as an independent nation. The United States have as much to fear as Germany from a use of British sea power for the exclusive interest of British trade expansion. I would go so far as to say that the only thing that can prevent a clash of British and American interests in the near future, with the balance of sea-power immensely in England's favor when that clash comes, is a successful challenge of England's monopoly of the sea, by the Central Teutonic Powers. To that extent I believe our national interests to be bound up with the cause of the Teutonic Allies. But with Germany, England, France and the United States, as the standard-bearers of western civilization, united in a league of peace, based on a policy of mutual concession where their interests conflict, and of mutual support where their interests coincide, based further on a world policy of justice to all and malice toward none, the progress of western civilization for some time to come would be assured. Any league or alliance that omits any one of these powers is sure to jeopardize again the peace of the world and to menace anew the whole fabric of civilization. American, even pan-American isolation seems no longer possible.

Though I have strongly dissented from your advocacy of an official governmental policy based on a moral approbation or disapprobation of the cause of any of the belligerents I agree with you in placing moral factors above cultural-intellectual and economic-material factors in estimating the final contribution of any nation to the cause of humanity and civilization. It is precisely because the people of the central Teutonic Empires have in this war shown to an eminent degree the possession of such moral qualities as devotion to duty, self-sacrifice, love of truth, honesty, thoroughness, conscientious workmanship, industry, faithfulness to fact, the achievement of freedom through self-discipline, the willingness to subordinate private gain and pleasure to national safety and welfare, that as an American citizen, valuing our great Anglo-Saxon tradition of free government, I advocate the recognition of these qualities as shown by the Teutonic Empires, without asking for or expecting any na-

tional, moral or other approbation of the German cause. And finally, as a teacher of youth in an American University, I conceive it to be my duty to emphasize the importance of cultivating in ourselves these *moral* qualities if we are to hand down to posterity unmenaced by private greed, and unjeopardized by public indifference, the precious heritage of our free institutions.

My respect for the personal character and professional standing of the members of your committee must be my apology for the length of this letter, and the strength of convictions which I cannot but be conscious of as *moral*, must be my apology for the emphasis of its tone.

Very sincerely yours,

J. DUNCAN SPAETH.

II. On the Submarine Controversy.
Reprinted from the *New York Times*.

Princeton University, June 4, 1915.

To the Editor of the *New York Times*:

There is a disposition in many quarters to criticize the note of the German Government as an attempt to evade the issue because it seeks to reach agreement on the facts in the case before the principles involved are discussed, the responsibility fixed, and the decision reached. Only the intensity of our feelings, our sense of outraged humanity, our sympathy with the sufferers of undeserved woe prevent us from recognizing in the German note an appeal to essential principles of justice as conceived by the Anglo-Saxon mind.

The fact that one is willing to serve on a jury and listen to evidence does not mean that he condones crime or lacks conscience. The law recognizes the establishment of motive as an important element in reaching a just verdict. To insist on the execution of sentence before the establishment of facts that bear essentially on the question of motive is equivalent to hanging first and hearing evidence afterward. There is danger that public opinion in America in its just and swift condemnation of the fearful sacrifice of innocent lives by the sinking of the *Lusitania*, be swept by impulses of humanity from the solid ground of justice. Every judge knows

how difficult it is to combine justice with humanity. To write them together is not to unite them.

We may well heed at this time the sober words of President H. A. Garfield of Williams College (New York Evening Post, June 2):

"America is united in its condemnation of killing women and children. Moreover, in condemning we ought to discriminate between things worthy of condemnation and things not to be condemned. The United States rightly insists that the killing of women and children is one thing, and the destruction of commerce quite another. Both must be stopped; but the President wisely deals with the two things separately—one at a time. We ought also to recognize that these offenses are one thing and the apportionment of the blame another, and that the blame cannot be fixed until certain facts are cleared up. This the German reply seeks to do. Her reply is not final, and she has not said that she fails to appreciate or refuses to concede the President's main point. It seems to me, therefore, unjust to impute to the German Government unworthy motives or moral callousness on the basis of its reply."

While there may be disagreement as to the facts alluded to in the German note, there are certain other facts of paramount importance at the present juncture which are fortunately not open to challenge. An excellent summary of them is to be found in the Washington despatch to the New York Times of June 2, under the caption, "Chronological Review of Correspondence with the Belligerents." From the summary as given by the Times, it appears that at the beginning of the war (August 6) our government asked the belligerents whether they intended to abide by the Declaration of London of 1909. Germany and Austria answered in the affirmative, conditional on a like observance on the part of the enemy. Russia and France awaited the decision of the British Government, which was (August 27) to the effect that they decided to adopt generally the rules of the declaration in question, subject to certain modifications and additions which they judge *indispensable to the efficient conduct of their naval operations*. (The plea of military necessity.)

These modifications and additions so interfered with American rights at sea that on December 26 Secretary Bryan sent a note to Great Britain protesting against the seizure and detention of American cargoes. As an answer to this protest Great Britain sent her notes of January 7 and February 10, "explaining the reasons for

these seizures and detentions." Meanwhile, the Government of the United States having failed in its effort to protect against seizure by Great Britain American wheat and cotton cargoes bound for Germany, the German Government, following the precedent of Great Britain's proclamation of a mined war zone around the North of Ireland and Scotland, gave warning of the establishment of a naval war zone around the British Isles to prevent the importation of supplies to England. February 18 this policy went into effect. February 20 the American Government suggested that a modus vivendi be entered into by England and Germany by which submarine warfare and the sowing of mines at sea might be abandoned if food-stuffs were allowed to reach the German civil population under American consular inspection. March 15 the British Government "flatly refused" (*Times* summary) the arrangement proposed by the United States, and published the British Order in Council, the object of which was and is to prevent commodities of all kinds from reaching or leaving Germany. This order has never been recognized by the American Government as in accord with international law.

These are the facts. What light do they throw on the present relations between the United States and Germany? On two occasions our government made proposals to Great Britain and Germany to secure their adherence to those "rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative." On each of these occasions Germany accepted and Great Britain refused the proposals of the Government of the United States. Having failed to secure Great Britain's assent to our interpretation of international law, can we now consistently ask Germany's assent to an interpretation of international law which has Great Britain's unqualified approval because it throws upon *us* the responsibility of securing for all her merchant ships immunity from attack by German submarines?

It is to be remembered that it would be unjust to our government to suggest that the proposals above referred to were pro-German. They were made in the interest of justice and humanity to both sides. When Germany agreed to abandon submarine attacks on merchantmen on condition of Great Britain's allowing the entry of foodstuffs, Germany's willingness to accede to our suggestion was sneered at in many quarters as an "empty concession" on the ground that her submarine policy was mere bluff. Having proved at terrible

cost that she had an effectual if desperate weapon of defense and retaliation, the substantial character of the concessions she was willing to make to the demands of the United States ought to be in fairness recognized in our negotiations with her now.

Moreover, the export of ammunition to the Allies from America has assumed such enormous proportions since February that attacks on merchantmen laden with ammunition have increased in frequency, culminating May 7 in the sinking of the *Lusitania*. It is too late for any but the governments involved to discuss the question of the reparation owed to this country for the loss of American lives. But the question of the future of submarine warfare is still open to discussion, and international law must take cognizance of it.

Our government might have confined itself to demanding protection for the lives and interests of American citizens only. It has taken higher ground. But when once we leave the ground of our technical rights under international law, and take our stand on universal principles of humanity and justice, can the question of our manufacture of ammunition for European belligerents be entirely ignored, and can we in fairness demand of Germany that she deprive herself absolutely and unconditionally of the only means she has of preventing American shrapnel from destroying the defenders of her women and children? On the necessity of protecting the lives of non-combatants at sea, all Americans of whatever sympathies are united. The only question is how shall it be done. If we were not manufacturing arms for the enemies of Germany, it would be easier for us to ask, it would be easier for Germany to grant the entire cessation of submarine warfare against merchantmen.

Is it inconsistent with our national honor and with humanity to suggest: (1) That we guarantee that no ammunition or arms of any kind shall be part of the cargo of passenger-carrying ships out of United States ports?

(2) That we demand from Germany absolute immunity from attack by submarines for all such unarmed passenger-carrying ships sailing from our ports, under whatever flag?

(3) Whether the crews of merchant vessels carrying munitions of war to any belligerent are non-combatants in any essential sense is open to question. But if ammunition and explosives were carried on slow cargo boats instead of on swift passenger steamers, our insistence on visit and search would be more likely to be complied with.

In insisting, and insisting rightly, on the elimination of the sub-

marine as an indiscriminate menace to innocent lives at sea, is it wise to estop ourselves for all future time from the use of our own invention as a commerce destroyer and a legitimate weapon of defense against economic strangulation or the importation of ammunition from abroad? Is it wise to put ourselves into a position where, if at any future time our own existence is threatened, we shall have to depend on the friendship of other nations rather than on the justice of our own cause and our own right arm; where we shall have to substitute the doctrine of foreign alliance for the American doctrine of self-reliance? Ought not a nation that is as proud of its rectitude of purpose and as conscious of its power as the American nation, to be too proud to profit by the fighting of others, too proud to cement its own prosperity with the blood of kindred peoples across the sea, too proud to be driven by fear of loss or hope of gain into alliances foreign to America's great tradition, and, in the words of Washington, "calculated to create dissensions, disturb the public tranquillity, and destroy, perhaps forever, the cement which binds the Union"? The cement that binds the Union will never be destroyed. Too much German blood has been shed in the kneading of that cement for Americans of German descent or sympathy ever to permit its destruction.

The American people are a unit behind their government in all its efforts to defend and safeguard the lives, property, and interests of American citizens. They are a unit behind their government in all its efforts to enable America to render disinterested service to humanity. But they are far from a unit in wishing to see the material and moral power of this country used to render successful the most gigantic conspiracy in restraint of trade ever organized by wealth and power against a nation which has in all its dealings with the United States shown an attitude characterized by the President of the United States in his note to Germany as "humane and enlightened," a characterization that will be borne out by a study of the correspondence between our government and Germany since the beginning of the war.

If it be argued that the British Order in Council is not a conspiracy in restraint of trade the answer may be made that our government in its notes to England has so construed it. And the American people are not united in wishing the United States to use its power and influence to deprive Germany now, and perhaps ourselves in the future, of the most effectual weapon of defense against a form

of embargo we held and still hold to be in violation of international law.

The writer of this letter was born in America, and owes no allegiance but to America. By ties of blood he is bound both to Great Britain and Germany, but his deepest loyalty is to that spirit of liberty which is the breath of American institutions. When he hears on all sides counsels of safety first and the wisdom of conforming to an over-powering majority opinion he remembers the brave words of the American poet:

'Tis man's perdition to be safe
When for the Truth he ought to die.

President Wilson, in his noble Memorial Day address, used these words: *"Duty for a nation is made up of so many complicated elements that no man can determine it. No group of men, without wide common counsel, can possibly determine what the duty of the day is. That is the strength of a democracy because there daily rises in the great body of democracy the expression of an untrammelled opinion which seems to fill the air with its suggestions of duty, and those who stand at the head of affairs have it as their bounden duty to endeavor to express in their own actions those things that seem to rise out of the conscience and hope and purpose of the great body of the people themselves."* In praying that the President in his hour of grave responsibility may voice the conscience and purpose of a united people it is the solemn duty of all of us that have convictions, to express those things that rise out of our conscience and our hope for America, so that those who stand at the head of affairs may hear, not indeed a note of sullen discord, but, amid the general loud acclaim, the deep undertone of a loyal minority, dedicated not less passionately than the majority to the hope that when the verdict of history upon America's part in this tragic woe comes to be written it may be: "Her thoughts were Freedom; her words were Truth; her deeds were Justice."

J. DUNCAN SPAETH.

